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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Mike Baloga, a custodian for the Pittston Area School 
District and vice president of the custodial union, alleges that 
the District and its maintenance director, Jim Serino, violated 
his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him based on 
his union association and related speech.  Treating Baloga’s 
speech and association claims together, the District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Serino, 
concluding that Baloga’s activity was not constitutionally 
protected because it did not implicate a matter of public 
concern.  As we recently emphasized in Palardy v. Township 
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of Millburn, however, where a public employee asserts 
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment as a free speech 
claim and a pure union association claim, those claims must be 
analyzed separately, and consistent with longstanding 
Supreme Court precedent, there is no need to make a separate 
showing of public concern for a pure union association claim 
because membership in a public union is “always a matter of 
public concern.”  906 F.3d 76, 80–81, 83 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, No. 18-830, — S. Ct. —, 2019 WL 2078114, at *1 
(May 13, 2019).  Because Baloga has raised a triable issue 
about whether he was retaliated against based solely on his 
union association, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and 
remand for further proceedings.  
 
I. Background 
 
A. Factual Background1 
Baloga became a full-time custodian for the District in 
1999.  Between 2008 and 2016, he worked most of the year at 
the primary center,2 where his duties related to field 
                                              
1 The facts set forth here are drawn from the parties’ 
statements of undisputed facts, deposition testimony, and 
exhibits.  Because we are reviewing a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment, we recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to Baloga as the non-moving party and make all 
reasonable inferences in his favor.  See Hugh v. Butler Cty. 
Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266–67 (3d Cir. 2005). 
2 The record refers interchangeably to the location 
where Baloga spent most of his time as both the “primary 
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maintenance and outdoor work.  Given the seasonal nature of 
that work, however, the District would transfer Baloga to the 
high school each year from December through late February or 
March of the following year, with the specific rotation dates 
depending on the District’s needs.3   
   
In addition to these job responsibilities, Baloga began 
serving as the vice president of the custodial union in 2010.  In 
this role, he was regularly approached by fellow custodians 
about problems they were having with the District, and Baloga 
made efforts to solve them internally, often acting as the 
union’s “mouthpiece” in relaying concerns to the District.  JA 
63.  However, the decision whether to escalate an issue to an 
official grievance was decided by Thomas Rome, the union 
president, in consultation with Baloga.   
 
According to Baloga and Rome, the relationship 
between the union and the District—and, in particular, its 
maintenance director, Jim Serino—was strained.  Over the 
years, Baloga testified, Serino repeatedly threatened that the 
school board would eliminate union members’ days off if the 
union continued to file grievances.  And according to Rome, 
“[t]here was never a good atmosphere” between the union and 
Serino, and it appeared that Serino did not “ha[ve] respect for 
the bargaining unit.”  JA 64.  Rome also testified that he 
                                              
center” and the “primary school.”  For consistency, we will 
refer to the location as the “primary center.”  
3 Although the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
prohibited transfers between the two schools, Baloga’s 
transfers were permitted as a past practice.   
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thought Serino “wanted [Baloga] out of the mix” because 
Baloga, “being [at the high school] . . . , being pro union, [and] 
being pro contract,” might “interfere” with Serino’s directives.  
JA 64.  School board members and others employed by the 
District likewise perceived Serino to have a negative attitude 
toward the union.   
 
In the 2015–2016 school year, Baloga rotated from the 
primary center to the high school in early January, a little later 
than usual.  Within a couple of weeks, Baloga learned that the 
District intended to require custodians to work on Martin 
Luther King Jr. Day even though they had received that day as 
a holiday for the past twenty-six years.  Teachers and students 
continued to have the day off.  On January 15, 2016, after 
consulting with Baloga, Rome filed a grievance on behalf of 
the union, challenging the District’s decision as a violation of 
a past practice.  The same day, Baloga sent a text message to 
Serino, and the following exchange ensued: 
 
Baloga: I have plans on Monday.  
Why are they making us 
work.  We never worked a 
[Martin Luther King Jr.] 
day ever.  In my 26 years.  
Do I have to take a day off?   
Serino: Unfortunately there is [sic] 
multiple events and lots of 
work that needs to be 
completed.  A day will have 
to be used if you are not 
present.   
Baloga: You can’t do anything as 
boss.  You[’re] the director.  
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You have a lot of influence.  
Why can’t you talk to 
[superintendent] Kevin 
[Booth].    
Serino:  Already did. 
Baloga:  In the past [former 
maintenance director] 
Clarence always got us the 
day off.  It really hurts us 
with families. 
 
JA 25.  Shortly after the union filed the grievance, Baloga also 
exchanged words with his direct supervisor, Ken Bangs, who 
told him that “because you filed a grievance on Martin Luther 
. . . King Day, the board now says you have to work full days 
on snow days.”  JA 212. 
 
 On the following Friday, January 22, 2016, Baloga and 
Serino spoke in person about the grievance.  According to 
Baloga, Serino was “very, very angry,” accused him of 
“complaining,” and said that if Baloga was “not happy [at the 
high school],” Serino “could transfer [him] today.”4  JA 215.  
Baloga demurred, telling Serino that he was happy in his 
position but that “people are coming to me as the vice president 
[of the union] wondering why they’re getting a day taken off 
                                              
4 Although Serino testified that he told Baloga during 
their conversation that Baloga was bringing down morale, 
Baloga disputes this and contends that Serino was upset 
because he thought Baloga was telling others that morale in the 
District was low.  
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them,” JA 40, to which Serino responded: “You should have 
never filed that grievance until you talked to me,” JA 36.   
 
Later that day, less than three weeks into Baloga’s 
rotation, Bangs notified him that he was being transferred back 
to the primary center, effective the next business day—that is, 
more than a month before his usual transfer date.  Serino did 
not explain the transfer decision to Baloga, but he asserted in 
subsequent deposition testimony that there were two reasons: 
(1) Baloga’s colleagues said he was “bringing the morale” of 
the group down by “whining,” JA 102; and (2) the District had 
hired new employees, so Baloga’s continued assistance at the 
high school was no longer necessary.  Notwithstanding the 
District’s prior practice of annual rotations, Baloga has not 
been assigned to work at the high school again since the 
transfer.  
  
Although the early (and, effectively, permanent) 
transfer did not change his pay or benefits, Baloga testified that 
it negatively affected him in other ways.  For example, he could 
no longer go home during lunchtime to help his wife, who 
homeschools their eight children, because the primary center is 
twice as far as the high school from his home.  He also could 
no longer work the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift—a benefit only 
available to workers at the high school—which had allowed 
him to go home early at least once a month.  Finally, he 
described the transfer as effectively a demotion in job 
responsibilities, with attendant reputational and emotional 
costs, as his tasks at the primary center during the winter 
months were menial relative to those at the high school, 
reducing him to “a mop and a broom.”  JA 38.  Fearful of 
further retribution, however, Baloga did not file a grievance to 
contest his transfer.    
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B. Procedural Background 
Baloga eventually filed the underlying complaint in this 
action, asserting two First Amendment retaliation claims 
against the District and Serino (the “Defendants”)—one for a 
violation of his freedom of speech and one for a violation of 
his right to associate with the union.  The parties then filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment, with the Defendants 
arguing that Baloga’s activity was not constitutionally 
protected, but that, even if it were, he failed to establish the 
other elements of a retaliation claim.  Defendants further 
argued that there was no municipal policy or custom as 
required to support liability against the District under Monell 
v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 
658, 690 (1978), and that Serino was entitled to qualified 
immunity because any constitutional right at issue was not 
“clearly established” at the relevant time.   
 
The District Court denied Baloga’s motion and—
reaching only the question whether Baloga’s activity was 
constitutionally protected—granted the Defendants’.5  
                                              
5 As for Baloga’s motion, the Court explained that 
summary judgment was inappropriate because the motivation 
for Baloga’s transfer was “far from clear.”  JA 8.  Although the 
Court acknowledged that “the temporal proximity” between 
the union’s filing of the Martin Luther King Jr. Day grievance 
and Baloga’s transfer was “somewhat suggestive of a 
retaliatory motive,” it concluded that many other factors, such 
as the transitory nature of Baloga’s transfers and the fact that 
the District had recently hired new employees to work in the 
high school, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the 
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Although the Defendants sought summary judgment on both 
Baloga’s speech and association claims, the District Court 
explicitly discussed only Baloga’s speech, concluding that it 
was not constitutionally protected because it did not address a 
matter of public concern under Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 
(1983).  Rather, the Court reasoned, his speech implicated only 
“his personal preference to have a paid holiday” and, at most, 
a concern for employee morale.  JA 12.  Even if Baloga’s 
speech did touch on a matter of public concern, the Court 
continued, Baloga’s “interest in speaking out” was subordinate 
to the interest of the District in assigning its personnel in a 
manner that “promotes harmony in the workplace and efficient 
performance of its mission.”  JA 15.  Without separately 
analyzing Baloga’s association claim, the District Court then 
granted summary judgment to the Defendants on both counts 
of the complaint.  This appeal followed.  
 
II. Jurisdiction and Applicable Standards 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review a district court’s grant or denial of summary 
judgment de novo, see EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 
448 (3d Cir. 2015), and may affirm on any basis supported by 
the record, Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
A dispute is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a 
                                              
District’s decision to transfer Baloga was not retaliatory.  JA 
8–9.  
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verdict for the nonmoving party,” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 
410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)), and a fact is “material” where 
“its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the 
suit under the applicable substantive law,” id. (citing Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 248).  At the summary judgment stage, our role is 
“not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the 
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for 
trial,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, and like the District Court, 
we must review the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, see Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 
265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 
III. Discussion 
 
To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,6 a plaintiff must prove that “(1) he 
engaged in ‘constitutionally protected conduct,’ (2) the 
defendant engaged in ‘retaliatory action sufficient to deter a 
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional 
rights,’ and (3) ‘a causal link [existed] between the 
constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.’”7  
                                              
6 To establish any claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that (1) the conduct at issue was committed by a 
person acting under the color of state law, and (2) the 
complained-of conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured 
under the Constitution or federal law.  See Kaucher v. Cty. of 
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006).  Only the second 
criterion is at issue here.  
7 The first element of the analysis requires a legal 
determination; the remaining steps present questions for the 
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Palardy, 906 F.3d at 80–81 (quoting Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 
463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006)).  If a plaintiff satisfies these 
elements, the government may avoid liability if it can show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the 
adverse action “even in the absence of the protected conduct.”  
Miller v. Clinton Cty., 544 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Watters v. City of Phila., 55 F.3d 886, 892 (3d Cir. 
1995)).   
 
Here, we address only Baloga’s association claim 
because he failed to press his speech claim on appeal.8  The 
                                              
fact finder.  See Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 195 
(3d Cir. 2001); see also Watters v. City of Phila., 55 F.3d 886, 
899 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen considering the protected status 
of [First Amendment activity], an appellate court must . . . 
make an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of 
the case.” (citations omitted)); Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 
228, 233–35 (3d Cir. 2000) (“It is a question of fact whether 
the [allegedly adverse action] reached the threshold of 
actionability under section 1983.” (citation omitted)); Zamboni 
v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 79–80, 79 n.6, 80 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(noting that whether protected activity was a motivating factor 
for an employer’s adverse action and whether the employer 
would have taken the action regardless are questions for the 
jury).   
8 In his briefing on appeal, Baloga refers almost 
exclusively to the associational rights at stake and at oral 
argument, Baloga’s counsel confirmed that the crux of her 
client’s argument was that he was retaliated against for his 
association with the union, not for his speech.  As Baloga has 
not meaningfully briefed or argued his speech claim on appeal, 
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District Court disposed of the association claim (like the 
speech claim) on the first element, treating Baloga’s speech 
and association as coextensive and concluding that Baloga did 
not engage in constitutionally protected activity because his 
speech did not involve a matter of public concern.  As a result, 
it had no need to reach the other arguments raised by the 
Defendants.  Defendants urge us to affirm on any of those 
bases, namely (A) that Baloga’s activity was not 
constitutionally protected; (B) that even if it were, Baloga has 
not raised a triable issue on the remaining elements of his 
retaliation claim; (C) that the record does not support liability 
against the District under Monell; or (D) that Serino is entitled 
to qualified immunity.  We consider these arguments in turn, 
beginning with the focus of the parties’ briefing, whether 
Baloga’s conduct was constitutionally protected.  
  
A. Element One: Constitutionally Protected 
Conduct 
Public employees do not surrender their First 
Amendment rights merely because they work for the 
government.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006); 
Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 194.  Nevertheless, “[w]hen a citizen 
enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept 
certain limitations on his or her freedom.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. 
                                              
he has waived it.  See In re: Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. 
VI), 873 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2017).  But even if his passing 
references to the free speech claim he raised in the District 
Court, e.g., as a “back up” argument, Oral Arg. at 09:45–10:20, 
were sufficient to preserve it on appeal, we would agree, for 
substantially the same reasons identified by the District Court, 
that it does not survive summary judgment.    
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at 418.  In the context of speech, the Supreme Court has 
demanded that we “arrive at a balance between the interests of 
the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.”  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 568 (1968).  We therefore undertake a three-prong 
inquiry: (1) whether the employee spoke as a citizen; (2) 
whether the statement involved a matter of public concern; and 
(3) whether the government employer nevertheless had “an 
adequate justification for treating the employee differently 
from any other member of the general public” based on its 
needs as an employer.  Palardy, 906 F.3d at 81 (citation 
omitted).  
 
As there is no dispute in this case that the first prong is 
satisfied,9 we consider below the second and third, that is, the 
public concern requirement and the balance of interests.  
 
1. The Public Concern Requirement 
Until recently, our Court had spoken only briefly about 
whether the public concern requirement that applies to speech 
claims also applies to association claims, and we did so outside 
the union context.  In Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Board of Public 
Education, a public high school teacher alleged that she had 
                                              
9 Defendants do not contest the District Court’s finding 
that Baloga spoke as a private citizen and not pursuant to his 
official duties as an employee.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424; 
Palardy, 906 F.3d at 81.  Thus, they have waived on appeal 
any arguments to the contrary.   
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been retaliated against for criticizing the school administration 
in a paragraph of a faculty newsletter.  968 F.2d 393, 395–96 
(3d Cir. 1992).  In addition to alleging a violation of her 
freedom of speech, the teacher claimed that her right to 
freedom of association had been violated because the 
statements in the newsletter were intended to garner faculty 
opposition to the school administration.  Id. at 400.  After 
acknowledging the split among Courts of Appeals on the 
question of whether the public concern element applied 
generally to freedom of association claims, we found it 
unnecessary to enter the fray because Sanguigni’s particular 
association claim “implicate[d] associational rights in 
essentially the same way and to the same degree” as her free 
speech claim and thus was subject to the public concern 
requirement applicable to any speech claim.10  Id. at 400; see 
also Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185 n.4 (explaining that application 
of the public concern requirement is appropriate where the 
“associational claim is linked closely enough with [the] free-
speech claim”).   
 
                                              
10 Specifically, we said that Sanguigni’s association 
claim was subject to the public concern requirement because 
“that claim is based on speech that does not implicate 
associational rights to any significantly greater degree than the 
employee speech at issue in Connick.”  Sanguigni, 968 F.2d at 
400.  In Connick, an employee circulated a questionnaire to her 
colleagues in an apparent effort to solicit their support for her 
position with respect to the office’s transfer policy, handling of 
grievances, and other matters.  See 461 U.S. at 141.  But neither 
Sanguigni nor Connick concerned union association.  
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In Palardy, however, we observed that in the context of 
a pure association claim based on union membership, i.e., 
based on status as a union affiliate and not any particular 
speech on behalf of the union, the public concern element is 
necessarily satisfied.  906 F.3d at 81–83.  There, the plaintiff, 
the vice president and then president of his union, alleged that 
he was passed over for promotion in the police department 
because of his leadership role in the union and his union-related 
activities.  Id. at 79–80.  As here, the district court analyzed 
Palardy’s speech and association together and concluded that 
Palardy’s activity was not constitutionally protected because 
Palardy’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern.  
Id. at 80.   
 
We reversed.  Where union-related speech forms the 
basis of an association claim, we explained, courts must assess 
whether the public concern prong is met on a case-by-case 
basis.  See id. at 83.  Indeed, because labor unions advocate for 
their members on a multitude of issues, “the number of 
possible subjects for union-related speech is similarly wide-
ranging.”  Id.  But where an association claim is premised on 
one’s membership in a union—“a dichotomy” where one is 
either a member of a union or one is not—no “justiciable basis” 
exists to determine which union association merits First 
Amendment protection and which does not.  Id.  Thus, 
consistent with longstanding Supreme Court precedent “that a 
public employee possesses a First Amendment right to 
associate with a union,” id. (citing Smith v. Ark State Highway 
Emp., 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979)), we recognized that “mere 
membership in a public union is always a matter of public 
concern,” id.  And because Palardy’s association claim was 
premised on the notion that he was retaliated against based on 
his “involve[ment] in union leadership,” i.e., “simply because 
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of his union membership, and not because of his advocacy on 
any particular issue,” we concluded that the public concern 
requirement did not stand in the way of that claim.  Id. at 79, 
81.  
 
Although we spoke in Palardy primarily about union 
“membership,” our recognition of the public concern inherent 
in union membership applies with particular force to union 
leaders, for the right of union membership “would be 
meaningless unless an employee’s right to participate in union 
activities were also recognized.”  Roberts v. Van Buren Pub. 
Sch., 773 F.2d 949, 957 (8th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).  As 
we said long ago, “[p]lainly efforts of public employees to 
associate together for the purpose of collective bargaining 
involve associational interests which the first amendment 
protects from hostile state action.”  Labov v. Lalley, 809 F.2d 
220, 222–23 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Smith, 441 U.S. at 464 
(“The First Amendment . . . protects the right of associations 
to engage in advocacy on behalf of their members.”).  And 
because a union’s ability to file grievances on behalf of its 
members is essential to its collective bargaining power, see 
Morfin v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 906 F.2d 1434, 1439 (10th 
Cir. 1990), retaliation against a union leader for the union’s 
decision to file a grievance—as distinct from retaliation based 
on the substance of the grievance—constitutes retaliation 
based on association rather than on speech per se, see 
Columbus Educ. Ass’n v. Columbus City Sch. Dist., 623 F.2d 
1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1980) (“[R]etaliat[ion] against the zealous 
representation by a union spokesperson of a member’s 
grievance impermissibly infringes upon the constitutional right 
of free association . . . .”); see also Prof’l Ass’n of Coll. 
Educators (PACE), TSTA/NEA v. El Paso Cty. Cmty. Coll. 
Dist., 730 F.2d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he First 
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Amendment [right of association] is violated by state action 
whose purpose is either to intimidate public employees from 
joining a union or from taking an active part in its affairs or to 
retaliate against those who do.”).   
 
Baloga has adduced sufficient evidence to persuade a 
reasonable jury that is what occurred here.  In addition to the 
evidence of Serino’s general animus toward the union and its 
leadership, Baloga testified that after he told Serino that union 
members were approaching him “as the [union] vice president” 
to complain about losing the holiday, JA 40, Serino responded 
angrily, “you should have never filed that grievance until you 
talked to me,” JA 215 (emphasis added), and Ken Bangs said 
that because “you filed a grievance on Martin Luther . . . King 
Day . . . you have to work full days on snow days,” JA 212 
(emphasis added).  But, of course, Baloga was not the person 
who actually filed the grievance for the union—union 
president Thomas Rome did.  Thus, “you” in this context could 
only mean “you, as representative of the union.”  In other 
words, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Baloga, 
Baloga was transferred because his union filed a grievance 
and—based on his status as a union leader—management 
attributed responsibility for that filing to him.  Under Palardy, 
that is enough to make out a viable association claim.  See 906 
F.3d at 84 (holding that “evidence suggesting [Township 
administrator] harbored animosity toward [Palardy] because of 
his union affiliation” as “a union member and leader” was 
sufficient to survive summary judgment). 
 
Defendants take a different view.  They contend that, as 
in Sanguigni, Baloga’s association claim “implicate[s] 
associational rights in essentially the same way and to the same 
degree,” 968 F.2d at 400, that his speech claim does, so that the 
 
18 
public concern requirement is not per se satisfied and should 
be found wanting here.  But, as we explained in Palardy, that 
view is misplaced in the context of a retaliation claim based on 
union membership.  Baloga, like Palardy, is arguing not 
merely—or even principally—that he was punished for his 
speech specific to the subject of the Martin Luther King Jr. Day 
holiday but, rather, that he was penalized for his “affiliation” 
as “a union member and leader,” Palardy, 906 F.3d at 84, of 
the union that had filed this and other grievances.  The 
substance of that latest grievance is simply irrelevant to his 
claim.  So understood, Baloga’s association claim 
“implicate[s] associational rights” in a different way and to a 
different degree than his speech claim, and because union 
membership (and, a fortiori, leadership) necessarily involves a 
“public concern,” summary judgment should not have been 
granted on the ground that this element was lacking.   
 
2. Balance of Interests 
Having concluded that the public concern element does 
not bar Baloga’s association claim, we consider whether we 
may nevertheless affirm on the ground that Baloga’s 
associational interests are outweighed by the Defendants’ 
interest in maintaining an efficient workplace and avoiding 
disruption.  See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Watters, 55 F.3d at 
895.  We have not addressed the question whether that so-
called “Pickering balancing” applies to pure association claims 
based on union membership and we need not do so today,11 for 
                                              
11 Pickering and Watters both involved speech claims, 
and, in Palardy, we did not explicitly address whether 
Pickering balancing is required for union-based association 
claims.  Four circuits have concluded or suggested that it is, 
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even assuming it does, Defendants have not established as a 
matter of law that their interest outweighs Baloga’s.  
 
A public employer bears the burden of justifying an 
adverse action taken against an employee once the public 
concern element has been met.  See Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 
197–98.  The weight of this burden “varies depending upon the 
nature of the employee’s expression.”  Id. at 198.  On one side 
of the scale is the employee’s interest in associating with and 
acting on behalf of the union and the public’s interest in unions 
serving the legitimate interests of their employee-members.  
See Palardy, 906 F.3d at 84; O’Donnell v. Yanchulis, 875 F.2d 
1059, 1061–62 (3d Cir. 1989).  On the other side is the 
government-employer’s interests in “promoting workplace 
efficiency and avoiding workplace disruption.”  McGreevy v. 
                                              
see Cook v. Gwinnett Cty. Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 1313, 1320–21 
(11th Cir. 2005); Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745, 
748–50 (5th Cir. 1993); Roberts, 773 F.2d at 957; see also 
Wilton v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 772 F.2d 88, 91 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (not citing Pickering but holding that “a first 
amendment right to associate may be validly limited where the 
limitation is necessary to a substantial and legitimate state 
interest”), but one has held that courts should not undertake 
Pickering balancing where the union and the employer have a 
collective bargaining agreement, see Shrum v. City of Coweta, 
449 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 2006).  Here, the parties argue 
about the balancing of interests but do not raise or engage the 
threshold question whether such balancing is required in this 
context.  We will assume without deciding that it is required 
here as we conclude that the balancing of interests would not 
justify summary judgment in any event.  
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Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Pickering, 391 
U.S. at 568); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.   
 
In balancing the competing interests, we consider 
“whether the [First Amendment activity] impairs discipline by 
superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental 
impact on close working relationships for which personal 
loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the 
performance of the [employee’s] duties or interferes with the 
regular operation of the enterprise.”  Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 
198 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)).  
This is a “fact-intensive” exercise, Miller, 544 F.3d at 548, and 
no single factor is dispositive, Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 198.  
Where the material facts are undisputed, the employee’s 
association is protected as a matter of law unless the 
government’s interest outweighs it.  See Azzaro v. Cty. of 
Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 980 (3d Cir. 1997); O’Donnell, 875 
F.2d at 1062.   
 
Defendants identify two interests that they contend 
outweigh Baloga’s associational interests: first, that the 
District has unfettered discretion concerning when to move 
Baloga between the high school and the primary center; and 
second, the need to avoid the disruption that Baloga allegedly 
caused by bringing down employee morale.  On this record, 
however, neither suffices to tip the balance in the Defendants’ 
favor.  
 
 As for the first, Defendants can hardly carry their 
burden with the tautology that they are entitled to do as they 
please in any area normally subject to their discretion.  If that 
were the case, few retaliation claims would survive Pickering 
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balancing.12  Although a public institution undoubtedly has an 
interest in assigning employees according to its needs, it may 
not do so for the purpose of chilling the exercise of 
constitutional rights.  Instead, in the context of a retaliation 
claim, it must articulate and substantiate a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for its actions.  See, e.g., Miller, 544 F.3d 
at 548 (including among an employer’s interests “the 
employer’s prerogative of removing employees whose conduct 
impairs performance” (emphasis added)); Roberts, 773 F.2d at 
957 (explaining that an employee’s associational right could be 
outweighed by the government’s needs “if the employee 
engages in the allegedly protected activities on the job, 
interfering with the performance of his duties or if the 
employee harasses coworkers and disrupts operations” 
(citations omitted)).  
 
A generalized interest in doing business-as-usual does 
not constitute such a reason and cannot categorically outweigh 
an employee’s interest in associating with a union.  This is 
particularly true where, as here, the institution asserting such 
an interest has explicitly sanctioned the existence of the union 
and the grievance procedure it employs by entering into a 
collective bargaining agreement.  See Shrum, 449 F.3d at 1139 
(explaining that a public employer’s interest in efficient 
operations does not outweigh an employee’s interest in union 
                                              
12 To the extent Defendants are arguing not an “interest” 
per se, but that they would have transferred Baloga even in the 
absence of his protected activity, that argument goes to 
causation, see Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 
232–33 (3d Cir. 2008), which we address separately below, see 
infra Section III.B.2. 
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association where the employer “already balanced those 
interests when it agreed to a collective bargaining agreement” 
and “presumably received the benefit of its bargain”); PACE, 
730 F.2d at 263 (“[I]f a public employer voluntarily establishes 
a grievance procedure, then discriminates or retaliates against 
union members in administering that process, it violates the 
first amendment.”); see also Azzaro, 110 F.3d at 980 (“By 
adopting a policy against sexual harassment and a process for 
reporting and dealing with it, [the] County had affirmatively 
recognized that complaints [in accordance with that policy] . . . 
do not pose an undue threat of disruption.”).   
 
As for their second proffered interest, the need to avoid 
disruption in the workplace is certainly legitimate.  See Rankin, 
483 U.S. at 388; Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 
979, 991 (3d Cir. 2014).  But the scant evidence that 
Defendants provide of such disruption or the potential for such 
disruption, see Watters, 55 F.3d at 898–99, is not sufficient to 
outweigh Baloga’s associational interests.  Indeed, Defendants 
offer only Serino’s self-serving hearsay testimony that other 
employees said Baloga was “bringing the morale . . . down” by 
“whining,” JA 102, but adduced no employee testimony or 
other evidence that Baloga’s union activities “impair[ed] 
discipline” by his superiors, impeded the performance of his 
duties, or interfered with the “regular operation of the 
enterprise,” Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 198 (quoting Rankin, 483 
U.S. at 388); see Swineford v. Snyder Cty. Pa., 15 F.3d 1258, 
1273 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the government’s interest 
outweighed employee’s where the government adduced 
evidence that “office conditions became intolerable” and the 
employee’s conduct “had an adverse effect on the discharge of 
[her] duties”).  Nor was Baloga’s relationship with Serino—
which is a “particularly important” consideration in the 
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balancing calculus, Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 198—“of such a 
personal and intimate nature” that Baloga’s actions “would 
seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working 
relationship,” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n.3; see De Ritis v. 
McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444, 458 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding highly 
relevant for the purposes of Pickering balancing the 
particularized need for strong relationships between employees 
and their manager in a small public defender’s office where 
employees represented the positions of their supervisor in 
court).  Our task is to weigh the opposing interests, and given 
how little Defendants have placed on their side of the scale, 
they have not succeeded in tipping the balance in their favor.  
 
 In sum, because Baloga’s union membership involves a 
matter of public concern and Defendants have failed to 
establish that their purported interests in efficiency and 
avoiding disruption outweigh Baloga’s associational interests, 
his conduct was protected by the First Amendment, and the 
District Court erred in holding otherwise.   
 
B. Remaining Elements of a Retaliation Claim 
1. Element Two: Adverse Action 
Even assuming Baloga’s conduct was protected, 
Defendants argue that summary judgment was justified 
because no reasonable jury could find Baloga’s transfer back 
to the primary center to constitute an adverse action “sufficient 
to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
constitutional rights.”  Appellees’ Br. 41; see Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000).  We are not 
persuaded.   
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Whether a public employer’s conduct rises to the level 
of an actionable wrong is “a fact intensive inquiry focusing on 
the status of the [employee], the status of the retaliator, the 
relationship between the [employee] and the retaliator, and the 
nature of the retaliatory acts.”  Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 
399, 419 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Suarez 
Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2000)).  
A public employer “adversely affects an employee’s First 
Amendment rights . . . when it makes decisions, which relate 
to . . . transfer . . . based on the exercise of an employee’s First 
Amendment rights.”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Suarez 
Corp. Indus., 202 F.3d at 686).   
 
Although the nature of the retaliatory acts committed by 
the public employer must “be more than de minimis,” 
amounting to more than “criticism, false accusations, or verbal 
reprimands,” id. (citation omitted), the threshold is “very low,” 
O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Indeed, we have observed that “an act of retaliation as trivial 
as failing to hold a birthday party for a public employee . . . 
when intended to punish her for exercising her” First 
Amendment right may suffice.  Suppan, 203 F.3d at 234 
(quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 76 n.8 
(1990)).   
 
In this case, Defendants urge that “any alleged adverse 
effect on Baloga due to his transfer was de minimis.”  
Appellees’ Br. 42.  But a reasonable juror could conclude 
otherwise.  Baloga testified that, due to his transfer being 
expedited and then effectively deemed permanent, he could no 
longer go home during his lunch hour approximately three 
months every year to help his wife with childcare 
responsibilities, and he could no longer work the shift that 
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allowed him to go home early from the high school at least 
once a month.  He also attested to consequences for his actual 
job responsibilities and reputation: whereas he engaged in a 
number of “big projects” at the high school, he had no 
significant work to do at the primary center during the winter 
months because the fields were covered in snow, “reduc[ing 
him] to a mop and a broom.”  JA 38.  We cannot say as a matter 
of law, then, that the alleged retaliation had no “adverse effect” 
for, viewed in the light most favorable to Baloga, the record 
supports the opposite inference.13  See Suppan, 203 F.3d at 
234–35 (holding that evidence of “stress” and “loss of 
reputation” from an unsatisfactory employment rating was 
sufficient to raise triable issue on adverse action); see also 
Cook v. Gwinnett, 414 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(deeming “los[s] [of] additional prestige and office 
responsibilities that came with being a team leader” sufficient 
to constitute adverse action); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 
888, 901 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding reputational harm stemming 
from involuntary transfer “from one school in the district to 
another” demonstrated sufficient adversity). 
                                              
13 In support of their argument, Defendants make much 
of the fact that the union itself continued to file grievances after 
Baloga’s transfer.  But the question here is not whether a union 
can operate after one of its members is retaliated against but 
whether an ordinary union member would be deterred from 
exercising his or her associational rights in the face of that 
retaliation.  And given the “very low” threshold for that 
showing in the First Amendment retaliation context, 
O’Connor, 440 F.3d at 128, Baloga has put forth sufficient 
evidence to bring that question to a jury.     
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2. Element Three: Causation 
Defendants next argue that they are entitled to summary 
judgment based on Baloga’s failure to prove the third element 
of a retaliation claim, causation.  Yet again, however, there 
remain disputed issues of material fact.   
 
If a public employee makes out the first two elements 
of a retaliation claim, he then bears the initial burden of 
showing that his constitutionally protected conduct was a 
“substantial” or “motivating factor” in the allegedly retaliatory 
conduct.  Suppan, 203 F.3d at 235.  He can establish the 
requisite causal connection by showing either: “(1) an 
unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the 
protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a 
pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal 
link.”14  Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 
259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).  If the employee 
makes out this prima facie case of retaliation, “the burden shifts 
to the [employer] to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it would have reached the same decision even in the 
absence of the protected conduct.”  Suppan, 203 F.3d at 235 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In view of the 
standard at summary judgment, that means that an employer, 
to prevail on causation, “must present evidence of such quality 
that no reasonable juror could conclude that the protected 
                                              
14 We have also observed that if such evidence is 
lacking, an employee may nevertheless prove causation “from 
the evidence gleaned from the record as a whole.”  Conard v. 
Pa. State Police, 902 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016)).  
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activity was the but-for cause of the termination.”  Hill v. City 
of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 126 n.11 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
Here, Defendants do not dispute that Baloga put 
forward sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of 
causation.15  Rather, they argue that they have met their burden 
                                              
15 This apparent concession is with good reason:  The 
record contains ample evidence from which a reasonable juror 
could conclude that a causal link existed between Baloga’s 
union activities and his transfer—either because “an unusually 
suggestive temporal proximity,” Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 267, 
existed between when the union filed the Martin Luther King 
Jr. Day grievance, when Serino approached Baloga about the 
grievance, and when Baloga was transferred to the primary 
center, given that all of the events occurred within the span of 
one week, see Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 
183, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that temporal proximity 
can itself be sufficient to establish a causal link) or because of 
the combination of the temporal proximity and the evidence of 
Serino’s animus toward the union more generally, see id. 
(holding that an employee who was terminated 10 days after 
engaging in protected conduct and whose boss had made 
negative comments about her protected conduct had put forth 
sufficient evidence from which a fact finder could determine 
the existence of a causal link); see also Merkle v. Upper Dublin 
Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 795 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Where a 
reasonable inference can be drawn that an employee’s 
[protected conduct] was at least one factor considered by an 
employer in deciding whether to take action against the 
employee, the question of whether the [protected conduct] was 
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to show they would have transferred Baloga to the primary 
center in the absence of his protected conduct for two reasons: 
first, because they transferred him every year, and second, 
because it is undisputed that the District had hired more 
employees to work at the high school that school year, thereby 
obviating the need for Baloga to continue working there.   
 
True though they may be, however, neither of those 
facts precludes a reasonable jury, considering the record as a 
whole, from finding causation.  That the Defendants intended 
to transfer Baloga at some point in the future does not logically 
rebut Baloga’s point that his union activity was the cause of his 
accelerated and apparently permanent transfer, which is the 
adverse action at issue.  Nor is the fact that the District had 
hired more employees dispositive of whether it otherwise 
would have transferred Baloga at that time.  To the contrary, 
the record reflects that, although one new hire was slated to 
begin work the Monday that Baloga was transferred, some, if 
not all, of the new employees were hired in March or April of 
2015,16 i.e., well before Baloga was even assigned to the high 
school, let alone transferred away from it.  And at no point 
before this transfer was Baloga advised that his rotation to the 
high school would be any shorter than usual or that his job 
duties there were being assumed by others.  Viewed in the light 
                                              
a motivating factor in that determination is best left to the 
jury.”).   
16 The record is not clear if the District hired two or three 
additional employees and, if three, when the third employee 
was hired.  But even the employee who began in late-January 
was necessarily hired before that time. 
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most favorable to Baloga, this sequence supports an inference 
that, notwithstanding the new hires, the District assigned 
Baloga to the high school in January 2016 with the expectation 
that he would complete his normal two-to-three month 
rotation, and that retaliation, not a new hire, accounted for its 
sudden change of heart just three weeks into that assignment 
and on the very day of Baloga’s conversation with Serino.  
  
Other evidence also arguably supports that inference.  
As the District Court itself recognized, the “temporal 
proximity” between the union’s filing of the Martin Luther 
King Jr. Day grievance and Baloga’s transfer was “somewhat 
suggestive of a retaliatory motive.”  JA 8.  And, likewise, the 
temporal proximity—mere hours—between Baloga’s 
exchange with Serino in which Serino expressed anger over 
Baloga’s “complaining” and threatened to “transfer [him] 
today,” JA 215, and Baloga’s being notified of his transfer 
effective the next business day raises questions about the 
credibility of Defendants’ explanation for their actions, cf. 
Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280–81 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (explaining that temporal proximity between an 
employee’s protected conduct and the employer’s adverse 
action coupled with inconsistent reasons given for the action 
can call into doubt the employer’s stated basis for the action).  
Also potentially probative to a jury are Serino’s and Bang’s 
alleged threats of reprisal for the union’s activities, the 
testimony about Serino’s general anti-union animus, and the 
myriad conflicting accounts about Appellees’ motivation for 
Baloga’s transfer in Serino’s testimony, Rome’s testimony, 
and Bangs’ testimony.   
 
While the District Court concluded that factors such as 
the transitory nature of Baloga’s transfers and the fact of new 
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hires precluded summary judgment in Baloga’s favor, it also 
recognized that the motivation for Baloga’s transfer (were it to 
reach the question of causation) was “far from clear,” JA 8, 
and, in view of the countervailing evidence, we must agree.  
Because a trier of fact could conclude on this record that 
Baloga would not have been transferred in the absence of his 
union activities, the quintessential “factual issue” of causation, 
Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 889 (3d Cir. 1997), 
remains, in this case, a question for the jury. 
 
C. Monell Liability  
The District next argues that even if Baloga can 
establish a constitutional violation, the District itself could not 
be held liable because there is no evidence that any municipal 
policy or custom caused that violation.  See Monell, 436 U.S. 
at 690–91.  A municipality may be held liable pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 only if a plaintiff is able to identify such a policy 
or custom.  See A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile 
Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 580 (3d Cir. 2004).  That requires a 
plaintiff to show, for a policy, that an official with final 
decision-making authority has “issue[d] an official 
proclamation, policy, or edict,” Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 
F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990), or, for a custom, that a course 
of conduct, though not authorized by law, was “‘so permanent 
and well settled’ as to virtually constitute law,” id. (quoting 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690).  In either case, the policymaker, as 
defined under state law, must be “responsible either for the 
policy or, through acquiescence, for the custom.”  Andrews, 
895 F.2d at 1480–81.  
 
We agree with the District Court that the record here 
does not support Monell liability.  As Baloga’s repeated 
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invocation of Superintendent Kevin Booth’s authority 
demonstrates, Serino did not have final decision-making 
authority and thus was not a policymaker under Pennsylvania 
law.  See Brennan, 350 F.3d at 428 (“[I]f a municipal 
employee’s decision is subject to review, even discretionary 
review, it is not final and that employee is therefore not a 
policymaker for purposes of imposing municipal liability 
under § 1983.”).  There is also no evidence that those who do 
qualify as policymakers, such as Booth or the school board, 
knew about, much less approved, Baloga’s transfer for an 
allegedly unconstitutional reason or delegated him final 
policymaking authority, as needed to impute liability to the 
municipality.  See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481.  On that basis, 
we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
to the District. 
 
D. Qualified Immunity  
Finally, Defendants argue that summary judgment was 
proper as to Serino because he is entitled to qualified 
immunity.  The doctrine of qualified immunity shields 
government officials performing discretionary functions “from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”  Miller, 544 
F.3d at 547 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982)).  The analysis is guided by two questions: (1) did the 
government actor violate a constitutional right? and (2) was 
that right “clearly established” at the time of the challenged 
conduct?  See Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 986.  As Baloga has 
raised a triable issue concerning the violation of his First 
Amendment right to association, our analysis here focuses on 
the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis.  
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For a right to be clearly established, “there must be 
sufficient precedent at the time of action, factually similar to 
the plaintiff’s allegations, to put defendant on notice that his or 
her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.”  Mammaro v. N.J. 
Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 
2016) (citation omitted).  Although the right at issue may not 
be defined “at a high level of generality,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011), the precise action in question “need 
not have previously been held unlawful” for the right to be 
clearly established.  Dougherty, 722 F.3d at 993 (citing 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); see also 
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (“[O]fficials can still 
be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in 
novel factual circumstances.”).  Where there is neither 
Supreme Court nor circuit precedent on point, “a robust 
consensus of cases of persuasive authority” may establish the 
federal right at issue.  al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (citation 
omitted).  
 
Here, Defendants contend that Serino is entitled to 
qualified immunity because “[t]here is no clearly established 
case law . . . that stands for the [proposition] that . . . a grievance 
about a day off[] constitutes constitutionally protected . . . 
association.”  Appellees’ Br. 51.  But Defendants 
misunderstand the right at issue.  Viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to Baloga, Serino retaliated against Baloga 
because he ascribed to him responsibility for the union’s 
grievance based on his leadership of the union.  Thus, the right 
at issue is a public employee’s right not to be subjected to 
adverse treatment for his leadership role in a public union—
not, as Defendants contend, for the content of the grievance 
that the union filed.   
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Once the right at issue is properly identified, it is 
apparent that “[t]he contours of [that] right,” Anderson, 483 
U.S. at 640, were clearly established when Serino ordered 
Baloga’s transfer.  The Supreme Court has long recognized the 
right to become a member of a union and the attendant right 
not to be penalized for that membership.  See, e.g., Smith, 441 
U.S. at 465 (“The First Amendment . . . protects the right of 
associations to engage in advocacy on behalf of their members 
[and] [t]he government is prohibited from infringing upon [this 
right] either by a general prohibition against certain forms of 
advocacy or by imposing sanctions for the expression of 
particular views it opposes.”) (citations omitted); N.L.R.B. v. 
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (“[A]n employer 
is free to communicate to his employees any of his general 
views about unionism or any of his specific views about a 
particular union, so long as the communications do not contain 
a ‘threat of reprisal . . . .’”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 
532 (1945) (holding that a state may regulate labor unions but 
“[s]uch regulation . . . must not trespass upon the domain set 
apart for . . . free assembly”).   
 
So have we and other Courts of Appeals.  See, e.g., 
Labov, 809 F.2d at 222–23 (“Plainly efforts of public 
employees to associate together for the purpose of collective 
bargaining involve associational interests which the first 
amendment protects from hostile state action.”); Cook, 414 
F.3d at 1320 (“[T]he law is clearly established that public 
employees have a First Amendment right to engage in 
associative activity without retaliation . . . [and] courts have 
long held that freedom of association protection extends to 
membership in organizations such as labor unions.”) (citations 
omitted); Morfin, 906 F.2d at 1439 (“The unconstitutionality 
of retaliating against an employee for participating in a union 
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[is] clearly established . . . .”); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 
693 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We have no doubt that an employee who 
is disciplined solely in retaliation for his membership in and 
support of a union states a valid first amendment claim . . . .”); 
PACE, 730 F.2d at 262 (“Th[e] right of association 
encompasses the right of public employees to join unions and 
the right of their unions to engage in advocacy and to petition 
government in their behalf.”).   
 
Given this “robust consensus,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 
742, we have no difficulty concluding that Baloga’s right not 
to face retaliation for his leadership role in a public union was 
clearly established at the relevant time and, thus, Serino is not 
entitled to qualified immunity.17  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
reverse in part the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment and will remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  
                                              
17 Defendants also weakly suggest that it was not clearly 
established in 2016 that a public employer’s retaliatory transfer 
would be actionable if it did not affect the employee’s pay.  The 
case law is to the contrary.  See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 74–75, 75 
n.8; Brennan, 350 F.3d at 419; Suppan, 203 F.3d at 234.  
